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Although its title suggests an &dquo;economic&dquo;
book pure and simple, Mr. Myrdal has given
us a book of breath-taking breadth. An
economist and sociologist of known achieve-
ments, a national political figure, and inter-
national civil servant of stature, Mr. Myrdal
speaks with an authority which at least this
reviewer finds at times overawing, if not
even stifiing. Moreover, the book draws on
a wealth of data such as only a big organi-
zation like the Economic Commission of
Europe can supply, and this, too, leaves the
reader occasionally overawed. Yet it is writ-
ten with sympathy and warmth but without
cheap optimism or defeatist pessimism,
which leaves one with the strong desire to
be in Mr. Myrdal’s corner of the ring. He
might, in fact, be characterized as a short-
run pessimist and a long-run optimist-a pes-
simist as to the size of the obstacles to be
overcome and the speed possible to over-
come them and an optimist as to the even-
tual destiny of man.
It should be made clear that even sum-
marizing the book is not really possible,
since Myrdal has written a concise, as well
as a long, book. Yet certain crucial prob-
lems emerge and certain proposed solutions,
and the reviewer must be forgiven if he
picks a few central threads and lays them
before the reader as the essence of the book.
The world, even before the fateful days
of August, 1914, never was really integrated.
But at least the Western world was inte-
grated after a fashion. It was an integration
based on the relatively free movement of
goods and services, on large movements of
people and of capital, on a gold standard
which gave supremacy to balance-of-pay-
ments problems, i.e., to international inte-
gration, if need be, even at the expense of
domestic instability. It was based on Eng-
land, around whose money and capital
market, industrial power, and naval suprem-
acy the &dquo;civilized&dquo; world grouped itself.
One might add that it was also a world in
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which &dquo;total&dquo; war had not yet been discov-
ered and the cold war had not yet been
thought of, in which military commitments
were limited and one fought for a piece of
land or something similarly and comfort-
ably limited, instead of for survival or world
domination.
This world is gone, if not forever, at least
for our generation and that of our children.
The reasons are manifold: There were wars
which in retrospect were avoidable, which
ate into the substance of nations, created
long-lasting hatreds and mistrusts, led to
misinspired peace settlements which them-
selves contained the seeds for further de-
struction and disintegration. But there were
other more subtle changes, foremost among
them the increasing integration of the na-
tion-state into the welfare state.
Now Mr. Myrdal is frankly for the wel-
fare state, which in a way was the Western
answer to Marx. Not only did the gulf be-
tween exploited and exploiters not widen,
it all but vanished, and it certainly was
bridgeable and increasingly bridged as na-
tions became richer and more and more able
to afford decency toward the less lucky
members of their own community. The basis
for this integration was, however, unfortu-
nately not the recognition that we are all
children of God but rather that we are all
members of the same political community,
what the Germans called for a while a
Schicksalsgemeinscha ft. To put it bluntly:
we had the same passport. Now, if one had
felt a child of God in this matter (even if
the child thought of himself as an atheist or
agnostic), the integration would have been
both local and international. As it was, it
was neither, but national instead.
This national integration was based on
the sociological-or at least non-economic-
fact that the members of a nation felt them-
selves to be part of one community, willing
to undergo sacrifices for one another, but
this feeling ot a community depended large-
ly on the fact that outsiders were excluded,
chiefly persons with the wrong passport.
The price of this national integration was
high. It spelled international disintegration.
No longer did people migrate freely; no
longer was capital to move freely; no longer
were domestic monetary or fiscal policies
aimed primarily to insure international com-
patibility with the policies of other nations.
Myrdal considers the price, though high, yet
reasonable, and he would not give up the
achievements of the welfare state. His pro-
gram is rather the extension of the welfare
state on a world-wide, or, rather, a non-
Soviet world-wide, scale.
There is a third reason for the present
state of the world. The underdeveloped
countries are on the move. While the West
has grown richer, the underdeveloped coun-
tries have certainly not kept pace and may
even have retrogressed. (Statistics are rather
poor to say whether they are now slightly
better or worse off than fifty years ago; it
does not seem to matter much, once you
are that poor. After all, a man who cannot
swim drowns in 10 feet of water as easily as
in 1,000 feet.)
Now half of Myrdal’s book deals with the
problems that the underdeveloped countries
have to overcome if they want to get any-
where except deeper into the hole. But basic
to their success, as well as to an outcome
acceptable to us and to them, is a change of
heart also on our side. We must learn to
think of them as fellow human beings rather
than as foreigners, just as we have learned
to think of farmers hit by drought or work-
ers hit by unemployment or aged hit by
sickness as fellow citizens rather than as
improvident or unlucky members of the
lower orders. That is, Myrdal basically pro-
poses the expansion of the welfare state on
a world-wide scale as his solution to the
present inconsistencies between domestic
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welfare and international responsibilities.
He would settle for a partial integration of .
the &dquo;free world.&dquo;
There is no glossing over the enormous .
difficulties-economic, political, sociological,
psychological-which must be overcome both
within the underdeveloped countries and in
the richer parts of the free world. The ne-
cessity for reforms, the urgency to do some-
thing about the population problem, the
crucial need for domestic capital formation,
and the essential need for patience within
underdeveloped countries not to takc second
before first steps are stressed as much as the
need for developed countries to get outside
their own shell and be true to their own
best heritage. It is impossible not to agree
with most of Myrdal analysis and with
virtually all his aims; and, indeed, there is
such a consensus of opinion that one ought
to wonder more than is customary about
why we are still so far from the desired goal.
Surely, one cannot quarrel with the de-
sire to see poor countries better off. Most
people even would somehow agree to an
international redistribution of income with-
out necessarily demanding a military or po-
litical quid pro guo and without any ulterior
motive if the problem were put plausibly to
them: after all, Christians have been send-
ing medical and educational missionaries
for a long time without thought of return;
vet the very people who have generously
financed a foreign hospital are likely to be
also people who object to their govern-
ment’s giving away their tax money unless
there is an immediate quid pro quo.
It is difficult to disagree with Myrdal’s s
analysis that only in exceptional circum-
stances is the relation of a giver to a receiv-
er bearable for all concerned and that the
injection of a more business-like (if not
business) spirit into international aid would
be all to the good. Similar proposals have
been made by others; thus Millikan and
Rostow’s book (2) spell out this kind of
proposal in great detail.
Underdeveloped countries will also meet
with a great deal of sympathy in their re-
quest that they be allowed an economic
behavior which in the case of advanced
countries would justly be considered dis-
ruptive of international integration and bad
international manners. Myrdal is quite
strong in his condemnation of tariff policies
to preserve a status quo in economies which
are flexible and quite capable of easing the
shocks of transition for the persons affected,
while at the same time he defends such
policies for underdeveloped countries with
a modernized and sophisticated version of
the old infant-industry argument. In fact,
he uses the argument (which is really mis-
named and should be called the &dquo;infant-
country&dquo; argument) in its only legitimate
manner. For the author of the Political Ele-
ment knows full well that in F. List the
tariff argument was bound up not with the
growth of a particular industry but with the
stage of development of the economy, and
this undoubtedly was also true for Hamilton.
Yet many uneasy questions remain in
one’s mind. He would be a brave man who
would defend colonialism, and I have no
intention of doing so. Yet Myrdal himself
again and again points to the Indian Civil
Service as a legacy of colonialism which
could be turned to good use. Even colonial-
ism, like Goethe’s Mephistopheles, at times
produced some good. Moreover, it seems to
me that colonialism (which was and is an
evil) has successfully been made responsible
for a lot of things of which it is quite inno-
cent, precisely because it is an evil. It is as
if a police chief put all murders committed
in his bailiwick on one murderer so that he
need not be troubled with the others.
The concentration of underdeveloped
countries in the production of raw materials
for the international market is a case in
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point. No doubt, comparative advantage (or
however you want to put it) accounted for
it in the first place. No doubt, the instabil-
ity of raw-material prices, the lack of diver-
sification of underdeveloped economies, and
the like are unfortunate, to say the least;
we may even grant that in some cases not
only was there no integration of the export
industries into the rest of the underdevel-
oped economy, but there may even have
been attempts to destroy existing cottage
industries and to prevent the growth of new
ones. And all this not only in the name of
colonialism (however disguised) but some-
times even in the hallowed name of free
trade and world integration itself.
Yet this seems far from the whole story
even for such a limited problem. In the first
place, in many instances export production
brought previously unused and sometimes
previously even unusable resources into
production. If the country did not get much
for the additional production, neither did it
lose anything in terms of opportunity cost:
Malayan rubber is a case in point, in which
previously sterile and virtually uninhabited
jungle was made to yield a crop with immi-
grant Chinese labor. According to Myint
(3), something like this also seems to have
taken place within Burma.
Mr. Myint also makes a further important
point which touches, of course, on Mr. Myr-
dal’s emphasis on internal reforms; not only
are the external terms of trade a problem
for many raw-material-producing countries;
so are their &dquo;internal&dquo; terms of trade, their
income distribution. To put this into the
shoes of colonialism (which Mr. Myrdal
does not do) or even onto the head of free
trade (which Mr. Myrdal appears to be do-
ing at times) seems to me to lean over
backward.
In fact, the insistence on free trade by
the developed countries seems to be some-
thing of a villain in the piece, though a
rather minor one. The major villains un-
doubtedly are the social conditions within
the underdeveloped countries themselves,
which have led them to accept, without
question and for all too long, a pattern of
explosive population growth, unproductive
use of such small savings as they can mar-
shal, corrupt government, and abject pov-
erty.
In fact, Mr. Myint concludes that at least
for countries like Burma which do not have
a population problem-&dquo;semi-empty coun-
tries,&dquo; as he puts it-it would be a mistake
to
&dquo;react blindly against the ’nineteenth cen-
tury’ pattern of international trade and em-
bark on a policy of protection to foster
domestic manufacturing industries. Our
analysis suggests that the chief source of
trouble lies with the internal pattern of eco-
nomic development rather than with the
external pattern of international trade. The
former failed to pass on the full benefits of
the international division of labor to the
people of the backward countries. It also
appears to be partly responsible for what-
ever disadvantages the backward countries
may have suffered in the way of unfavor-
able external terms of trade and lack of dy-
namic economic stimulus from international
trade.
&dquo;This would suggest that the people of
the backward countries are likely to gain
most from a compromise policy of external
free trade combined with internal state con-
trol. In the peasant sectors, state control
should take the form of more effective use
of the marketing boards already in existence.
In the non-peasant sectors, state investments
and partnership with private concerns may
be needed to facilitate the switch-over from
the cheap labour policy to a better labour
policy with a greater vertical mobility of
labour into skilled grades.
&dquo;This conclusion, of course, applies only
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to the particular, but not unimportant, type
of backward country we have been consid-
ering and not to the overpopulated back-
ward countries where the case for a protec-
tionist policy for industrialization may well
be stronger&dquo; (3, p. 141).
Now this is not quite the same as Myr-
dal’s findings, but it is nevertheless quite in
line with his (and everybody’s) aims. Myr-
dal suggests, in fact, that a developing coun-
try which does not develop balance-of-pay-
ments trouble is not doing well-oil coun-
tries perhaps excepted-and that tariffs im-
posed by underdeveloped countries would
not reduce trade but only change the com-
position of their imports. Yet Metzler’s anal-
ysis suggests that, in the case of a country
faced with an inelastic demand, tariffs will
not have a protective effect, since they will
turn the terms of trade in favor of the ex-
port good (1) even when the tariff is in-
cluded in the import price.
I believe that some countries like Burma
can make a good case for tariffs, but not on
the basis of the infant-industry or infant-
country argument. If the Metzler analysis
applies, i.e., if the country faces an inelastic
demand (and this is what most underdevel-
oped countries claim), tariffs will increase
foreign-exchange earnings precisely because
the terms for trade will move violently in
favor of the tariff-imposing country. And,
since foreign exchange is a scarce resource,
any increase in its availability will ipso facto
enable the country to speed up the develop-
ment of its economy. (All this assumes, of
course, no retaliation on the part of other
countries. )
Second, an argument could be made that
tariffs in underdeveloped countries are a
particularly good way of taxing people who
have an income. In a country in which a
progressive income tax is administratively
not feasible and in which imports go mostly
to the upper-income groups, tariffs may well
be the only way to tax them and to mobilize
some of their resources for investment. In
fact, tariffs may be the only form of taxation
which can be collected at all. But this is not
to say that the &dquo;protected&dquo; industry will
now develop at home. Quite the contrary.
Therefore, while I find myself quite un-
convinced of the indictment of free trade
even in the case of underdeveloped coun-
tries, I nevertheless would be happy to see
underdeveloped countries improve their ag-
riculture and build up their industries; and
I would accept certain interferences with
trade. Thus I find myself in the strange
position of disagreeing on the arguments
but agreeing on the aims and even largely
on the means to the ends.
Myrdal stresses another point: underde-
veloped countries should increase domestic
industrial production not only for the domes-
tic market but also for exports primarily to
each other. To this I would heartily agreed 1
Yet this really provides another argument
for free trade. If the trade matrices of un-
derdeveloped countries were analyzed, I
believe it would be found that the kind of
goods they could quickly produce under
the stimulus of protection are imported from
one another (or perhaps from Japan and
India, such as textiles), while imports from
advanced countries are mostly capital goods,
on which development depends, or food for
the masses, which in particular situations
cannot be had elsewhere. The poor coun-
tries are liable to cut one another’s throats
by tariffs rather than protect themselves
from competition by advanced countries.
The problem might be partially solved by
... -- - - -- --- ---- --- ------ --- -- ---- ----- -- -- --..........................................-
1 Many of the points were made in the ILO
document, The Economic Background of Social
Policy Including Problems of Industrialization
(New Delhi: ILO, 1947 ), which appeared anon-
ymously as a committee report but which was
written by Dr. Chang Hsieh (still at the ILO)
and the author.
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circles of discrimination as it were, under-
developed countries trading freely with one
another but discriminating against advanced
countries. The formation of regional cus-
toms unions might be sensible. Yet, while it
is at least understandable that poor coun-
tries should try to keep competitive imports
from other countries away from their bor-
ders, this in no way excuses the &dquo;voluntary&dquo;
export controls that Japan put on her textile
exports to the United States, of which I, as
an American citizen, feel rather ashamed.
I have deliberately tried to make a case
for freer trade as one satisfactory means of
international integration, satisfactory even
to undeveloped countries. This does not im-
ply that I would not like to see those coun-
tries force the rate of investment in agricul-
ture and outside it, or that I disagree with
Myrdal on the need for increased capital
movements and even some international re-
distribution of income. Everything Myrdal
has to say on the necessity of increasing
productivity in the underdeveloped coun-
tries is most urgently true.
Yet, where governments are corrupt and
inefficient and there is insumcient entrepre-
neurial talent, is there any reason to believe
that increased state control will do the trick?
I have no objection to state enterprises as
such or to the Western type of over-all
planning, and I am quite ready to be con-
vinced of the desirability of a degree of
planning to speed development and guide
resources into the deserved channels. But it
is precisely in those countries which need it
most that governmental planning is liable
to fail. I am not trying to make a case for
a simon-pure free-enterprise economy in,
say, Ceylon. Clearly, the social and historic
preconditions there are vastly different from
our world, and different forms will have to
be found to develop the economy and raise
the standard of living without imposing the
kind of slavery directed from Moscow.
The point to be stressed, by Myrdal as
well as by every competent observer, is that
if a country really wants to develop and
understands what it is all about and is will-
ing to pay the price not only in terms of
lowered consumption but of very deep-
seated social changes, nothing but the coun-
try itself can stop it from developing-short
of military occupation and deliberate sup-
pression from the outside. Naturally, this is
a vast overstatement, but the kernel of truth
is rather bigger than the proverbial grain of
salt. Political and social reforms must come
from the inside; outsiders can only be asked
not to perpetuate corrupt regimes. All this
is known. But, once it is understood, it puts
a somewhat different complexion on two
problems discussed by Myrdal-the need for
international mobility of people as well as
of capital and the population problem.
Classical theory was built upon the as-
sumption of international immobility of the
factors of production-a strange assumption,
no doubt, to make in the nineteenth cen-
tury and one made, therefore, one suspects,
for reasons of analytic convenience rather
than for &dquo;realistic&dquo; or political reasons. As
Myrdal points out (in the Appendix), the
theory is therefore more relevant today
than when it was originally developed.
One may speculate that the assumption
was made originally for definitional pur-
poses : We are analytically interested in the
relation of more than one market. When is
a market one market? When factors are
mobile. When is it two markets? When
factors cannot move and when therefore
the old labor theory of value becomes in-
applicable. It may be as simple as that; so
why try to find more complicated political,
sociological, or psychological reasons when
a simple one is available?
Putting it this way makes Myrdal’s points
even more apropos. If &dquo;integration&dquo; is to
mean &dquo;to become one market,&dquo; then factors
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ought to become mobile, and not only goods.
This, however, is a different meaning of
&dquo;integration&dquo; from the classical one work-
ing through the free movement of goods
alone.
The classical economists showed-and
none has yet proved them to have been
wrong under- their own assumptions-that
free trade would benefit all, compared to a
no-trade situation, though none has ever
proved that free trade was the best of all
possible policies. Productive countries would
still be richer in this analysis than less pro-
ductive ones. Recent analysis has shown
that free trade in goods may be not only a
partial (5) but a complete (6) substitute
for the free movement of factors. I am
quite aware of the stringent assumptions
which are required to make labor price
equalization come true, and Ohlin, Heck-
scher, and Samuelson have, of course,
stressed the lack of realism of some of the
assumptions. But the analysis serves, never-
theless, to point up that it may not be the
lack of free factor movements that is re-
sponsible for differences in living standards.
There are a few more points to be raised.
Admit for a moment that China is overpop-
ulated. Would a free movement of Chinese
labor to the United States ameliorate the
position of those who remained behind,
other things being equal? The answer is, I
believe, obvious: not unless substantial so-
cial and economic changes occurred in
China. Free movement of population-which
I believe to be desirable, if only for the
political reason that people should be en-
abled to escape tyrannies and police states
-are palliatives, even crucial palliatives.
But they are not essential to integration, if
by this is meant a state of affairs in which
peaceful intercourse of nations exists which
permits all to benefit from this intercourse
and to develop to the best of their abilities.
Nor, if I read Myrdal correctly, does he in-
tend to claim any more than that.
Many of the poor countries do have ex-
plosive population situations. Hence the
difficulty is how to break through their vi-
cious circle in which any increase in pro-
duction will simply support more people at
a starvation level. Countries which have al-
ready broken the circle, which have the seed
of self-sustaining growth in them, would
benefit by the breathing space that free mi-
gration of some of their population might
afford them. The breathing space might
even make the difference between success
and failure. But, for others, migration might
not even provide a temporary easing.
This seems to me the crux of the popula-
tion problem: why is it that in some coun-
tries a population increase will tend to raise
per capita production while in others it will
crush any hope for a better future? The an-
swer that some countries are just overpopu-
lated and others are not or that the rate of
increase is just too much is true enough
and yet comes close to begging the ques-
tion. Everyone, after all, knows that over-
and underpopulation-or optimum popula-
tion, for that matter-are relative concepts,
and many of us learned it from yet another
book of Myrdal’s. It is clearly essential to
stop a population explosion in India before
it occurs; but if such a limitation of popu-
lation growth is successful, it will help
raise living standards only because India is
already on the move, because she has al-
ready a good beginning of self-sustaining
growth.
I am neither a population expert nor a
sociologist. Yet it seems to me that the an-
swer must be found somewhere in the
structure of society and in the reactions of
the economy, which are vastly different in
underdeveloped and in developed coun-
tries. If an increase in population leads
simply to amoeba-like splitting-another
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similar village is set up, another Greek col-
ony is established which is a replica of the
first-even the halt of population growth is
not likely to do much good.
But in Western societies big cities are not
simply bigger editions of small towns, nor
are big factories simply blown-up small fac-
tories. Methods of organization change with
growth; methods of production and perhaps
even production functions change; there is
some creative response to growth, some in-
creased structuring which seems to turn
population growth from a curse into an as-
set. I hesitate to speak more on a subject
on which I am not expert, and I take the
courage to speak as little as I do from the
apparent absence of what could be con-
sidered a satisfactory population theory any-
where. Yet it seems clear that the popula-
tion problem, which is real and staggering,
is itself an outgrowth or a corollary of the
very conditions which keep a country poor.
The vicious circle of the population prob-
lem must be broken to give the other needed
reforms a chance to survive and to give a
country a chance to develop. But the cru-
cial features of developmental policies, as
Myrdal also stresses, lie even deeper than
population policy. Yet what a waste to have
people born merely to die young, never to
grow to productive age, never to be able to
enjoy what life could be.
Where does all this leave us? Clearly,
Mr. Myrdal has written a moving and im-
pressive book which is a &dquo;must&dquo; for every
reader, economist and non-economist alike.
His conclusion, entitled &dquo;A World Adrift,&dquo;
leaves little to optimism, cheap or consid-
ered :
&dquo;A study of trends and problems in the
field of international economic integration
ten years after the end of the Second World
War must invest us with humility and even
anxiety. This is, indeed, the effect which
the marshaling of the data and the infer-
ences under the various chapter headings
have had upon the present author. It is not
possible to conclude that the non-Soviet
world is now on the way to a higher level of
economic integration. In most respects the
trends are definitely in the opposite direc-
tion.
&dquo;The practical problems facing us, if we
want to change these trends, are momen-
tous. Like all problems they can be solved
on paper, and as my interest is constructive
and primarily practical such paper solu-
tions to the specific problems are presented
in the various chapters. But my analysis has
led me to conclude that translating these
paper solutions into practical action would
assume radically changed attitudes in all
nations, and honesty requires that this cru-
cial conclusion be put before the reader con-
stantly. As the problems are urgent and as
I fail to see what can induce such large
changes in attitudes quickly enough, I fi-
nally emerge with what amounts to a string
of almost insurmountable difficulties. I have
not set out to write another utopia but a
factual and practical tract: not to describe
what could be done in a dream world but
what we can reasonably expect to happen
in the world in which we live. And such an
analysis of international integration prob-
lems at the present time is bound to be dis-
heartening if it is at all realistic.
&dquo;In fact, I know of no government and
no political party in any country which is
really facing up to these problems. There
are small groups, like the Quakers in the
Anglo-Saxon countries and some of the qui-
et scholars of the Roman Catholic Church,
who, because of their religious preoccupa-
tion, have acquired the strength to see be-
yond the more immediate things. And there
are in all parts of the world many individ-
uals in the great humanistic tradition who
also see what the inevitable conclusion must
be. When such persons accept political re-
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sponsibility-and some of them have re-
sponsibility of the highest order-a condi-
tion for continuance in power is that they
accept and recognize the practical possibil-
ities at hand in their several countries, de-
termined by their fellow citizens’ present at-
titudes and so reserve their profounder in-
sights for general pronouncements that do
not upset practical affairs&dquo; (4, pp. 299-
300).
The return to the paradise of the nine-
teenth century, if paradise it was, is closed.
We cannot, even if we try, do consciously
through the International Monetary Fund,
the International Bank for Reconstruction
Development, and other institutions what
we did unconsciously before 1914. We do
know now &dquo;good and evil&dquo; and that inno-
cence, once lost, is lost forever. Dismantling
the welfare state would not get us back to
paradise; the battle cry of some neoliberals
is not utopian for the future, it is romantic
backward-looking. But the end is not hell
but a necessary rebirth. ’I’he brotherhood
of man-even if his skin is not white and his
passport is from a queer country-may well
be the only rallying cry left to us.
Yet, if once we were in paradise, why
not make such use of what we remember as
we can? If we cannot get free movement of
people, let us get at least as much trade as
we can. If people cannot move to the in-
dustries, let the industries move to the peo-
ple. And let us insist that some policies will
not do the trick: Burning hotels is no way
to get tourist dollars; blasting Lessep’s stat-
ue will not earn Suez dollars; and national-
izing foreign assets will not attract foreign
capital even as a gift, except in unusual
cases. And let us insist that some of the
older ideals may have been and may still be
easier to achieve than the utopia of one free
world.
And this is, in a way, precisely what
Myrdal is urging us to see. It is inherent in
the problem that there will be disagreements
in detail, and it is inherent in our perspec-
tive that details will loom large when viewed
from nearby. But the aim of developing un-
derdeveloped countries, so that a family of
free nations which are truly equal can
emerge, remains and overshadows the de-
tails of just how much free trade is a good
thing.
Nor is there quite as much conflict, I be-
lieve, between the welfare state-which, af-
ter all, only admits that we are our brother’s
keeper (who of us would deliberately pre-
fer to be Cain, his brother’s murderer ?)-
and international co-operation, as some text-
book versions would lead us to believe.
Even the experts of the numerous interna-
tional conferences of the 1920’s tried to
convince the various countries of the need
to co-ordinate their monetary policies to rec-
oncile domestic aims and international re-
sponsibilities. Our knowledge of economic
processes has increased substantially since
then. Monetary discipline, to use a recent
rallying cry, need not, after all, mean unem-
ployment ; and international co-operation is
quite consistent with siphoning off excess
purchasing power, particularly within an
advanced economy, by means which are
vastly superior to tariffs, to say nothing of
quantitative restrictions. At the same time,
the refusal of some British coal-mining union
locals to admit Hungarian refugee miners
seems more like an example of human per-
versity than a necessary concomitant of the
welfare state.
If anything emerges clearly from Myrdal’s
book, it is that our choices are really not at
all of the &dquo;either-or&dquo; variety but 0f the
&dquo;more-or-less&dquo; kind. The overriding case for
raising the living standards in underdevel-
oped countries remains. So does the case for
as much international integration as possi-
ble through the free movement of goods as
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well as through such other means as our
conscience dictates or ought to dictate.
This is Myrdal’s conclusion:
&dquo;The industrially advanced countries have
increasingly during recent years stalled on
all these practical matters of international
cooperation; my fear is that this may con-
tinue and that at the same time, bitterness
will grow in the underdeveloped countries
where stagnation will persist and economic
development in any case be uneven and too
slow. The advanced countries, under the
impact of the cold war, and the spur of an
unbroken sequence of political calamities,
have felt compelled to devote an enormous
share of their growing wealth to increasing
continually their military power of destruc-
tion, which under the circumstance is un-
derstandable and defensible. But by the
logic of the tragedy this has also given rea-
son to their economic nationalism and com-
fort to their conscience when stalling on in-
ternational cooperation. My fear is that they
will continue to find reasons and comforts
useful to this end.
&dquo;To close this book on a note of fatalism
would, however, be contrary to its purpose
and its basic nondeterministic philosophy.
The future is not a blind destiny but it is,
instead, under our responsibility. We have
the powers to analyze the facts and to es-
tablish rationally the practical implications
of our ideals. We have the freedom to read-
just our policies, and, thereby, to denect
and change the trends&dquo; (4, p. 335).
There is a price of leadership to be paid
by advanced countries. Mr. Eisenhower has
stated it in his Second Inaugural Address:
&dquo;The building of such a peace is a bold and
solemn purpose. To proclaim it is easy. To
serve it will be hard. And to attain it we
must be aware of its full meaning-and
ready to pay its full price.&dquo;
But, as in the ancient fairy tales, the im-
possible tasks that are set the hero turn out
suddenly to be quite manageable. I should
not be surprised to find that, however great
the obstacles are in prospect, in retrospect
they may well turn out to have been less
formidable than we thought.
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